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This study uses mostly secondary data to investigate the land question in 
Zimbabwe. The findings show that while the pre-colonial period was relatively 
stable, the colonial period was characterised by the dispossession of native lands 
using various legal instruments to legitimize the process. At the Lancaster House 
Constitutional Conference of 1979, Britain agreed to fund Zimbabwe’s resettlement 
program on a ‘willing-seller willing buyer’ basis to purchase land.  Changes made 
to both the Constitution and the Land Acquisition Act in 1991 to allow government 
to ‘designate’ land for resettlement met opposition from white farmers, Britain and 
the donor communities leading to the exit form the program of the latter two in the 
late 90s. From then, government adopted the ‘fast track’ program to speed land 
acquisition by making amendments to the Constitution to obligate Britain, to pay 
compensation to farmers with designated land. Despite the violence precipitated by 
the approach, the process received the Zimbabwe Supreme Court seal of approval 
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“In a very basic sense, the environment is what we think it is, and as its 
citizens and decision makers, we respond to it and deal with it as we 
conceive it to be.”  (Moore and Golledge, 1976: 4.) 
 
Zimbabwe’s independence in 1980 had different meanings and significance 
to the country’s pluralistic society. To the indigenous black people, it meant 
an end to the dehumanizing colonial period during which the indigenous 
people were dispossessed of their lands and subsequently impoverished by 
the contemporary standards of material-well-being (Roder, 1964; Ladley and 
Lan, 1985). Independence meant to them, among other things, access to 
productive land – a long cherished dream of the landless peasants. To the 
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white colonial settlers, it meant the beginning of a period of uncertainty 
arising from fear of reprisals from the indigenous communities – a potential 
reversal of the material gains of the ninety years of colonialism (The 
Economist, 26/01/1991; 22/05/1993).  
 
While a lot of research has been done on Zimbabwe’s land issue, most of it 
tends to concentrate on post-independence implementation of the 
resettlement program (Rukuni, 1994; Masilela and Weiner, 1996; Kinsey, 
2004). There is a dearth of longitudinal studies that capture the concerns and 
anxieties of both blacks and whites on the land issue and instruct policy on 
land reform in Zimbabwe. This is the gap that this study attempts to fill. 
Thus, given the country’s history, the plurality of its society and the variety 
of users of its landscape, all of which mutually influence one another, what 
human-environment focused approach can Zimbabwe adopt for its land 
reform program?  
 
To address this question, this paper utilizes the ecological framework loosely 
fused with the transactional perspective to analyze human-environment 
relationships as they relate to the land question in Zimbabwe. The approach 
hinges on the premise that an analysis of how people use space should not 
only include the description of what space is being used for what purpose but 
also a description of the broader context of this space including not just its 
physical properties but its social, organizational, and cultural properties as 
well. Thus, activities are better understood when apprehended in the setting 
of which they are part (Amedeo, 1993).  
 
Since human action has a temporal dimension (Geertz, 1963), the objectives 
of this paper are to analyse the land case in Zimbabwe over three periods: 
 Pre-colonial period human-environment relations (period prior to 
1890);  
 The colonial period (1890 to Zimbabwe’s Independence in 1980); 
and, 
 The post-colonial period (1980 to present). 
 
The paper concludes by suggesting the way forward on the land question.  
 
Thus, this study adopts the longitudinal approach as its research design. 
Sources of information for the study are mainly published journal articles, 
internet sources, books, and government reports on the subject, key 
informant interviews, memos and personal observations by the author 
especially during the post independence period.  
 




The study is significant in that in analysing human-environment relations; we 
will be able to understand their essential nature and the processes by which 
these relations, in turn, operate to influence on-going activities in 
environments. In addition, besides attempting to guide policy on the land 
question in Zimbabwe, it contributes to the evolving debate on post-colonial 
land policies, especially in Southern Africa (Austin, 1975; Moyo, 1995; 
Akpan et al., 2006) and the geography of dispossession (Wishart, 1999).  
 
 
Human-environment relations concepts 
 
The simplistic looking definition of environment made by Moore and 
Golledge (1976) quoted at the beginning of this paper alludes to the fact that 
the term environment may refer to a multiplicity of meanings to different 
persons. The Oxford Advanced Learners’ Dictionary by Hornby (2001: 389) 
defines environment as (among other things): 
 
 The conditions that affect the behaviour and the development of 
somebody/something; the physical conditions that somebody/something 
exists in.  
 The natural world in which people, animals and plants live. 
 The social and cultural forces that shape the life of a person or a 
population”  
 
More and Golledge (1976) further highlight that environment is conceived or 
imaged in different ways by different people as a result of different socio-
cultural factors and varying life experiences. Thus, different individuals can 
obtain different information in a given perceptual situation. The sort of 
information that the individual obtains depends on the nature of the 
knowledge that he brings with him into the perceptual situation.  
 
Rapoport (1982) draws to the attention that environments are more than 
physical features and that people react to environments in terms of the 
meanings the environments have for them based on environmental cues. 
Viewed from the perspectives of conducting human activities in them, 
environments are considered more like physical-socio-cultural systems – 
connected and not random elements with no relations to one another.  
 
Evidence from sociology and social geography also indicates that different 
social cultural groups conceive of their environment and space in entirely 
different ways as these have different symbolic meanings for different 





that sense of place identity that helps to define the role he plays in society 
(More, 1979). Friedrickson and Anderson (1999) further highlight that the 
term sense of place loosely refers to the idea that people have some positive 
affective sentiment for specific places, be they social, natural, cultural, or 
historic resources.  
 
What this all brings us to from an environmental planning point of view is 
the reality that decision makers and users are often very different in their 
reactions to environments, or even their preferences as their schemata varies. 
It is often the user’s meaning that is important as it is the meaning of 
everyday environments (Rapoport, 1982). With regard to human-
environment relations, or the manner in which individuals establish durable 
relations with the environment (Amedeo, 1993), it is noted that these evolve 
over time as a result from individuals carrying out their activities and having 




Several frameworks or paradigms have been developed to study such 
relations (Aitken, 1991; Altman, 1990). More pertinent to this paper are 
those in keeping with the idea that all human-environment connections are 
part of a greater process that relates the individual’s activities and 
surroundings into one scenario. An expanded ecological approach with 
borrowed ideas from the transactional perspective seems in part to be able to 
provide a suitable framework of analysis through which the nature and 
processes by which human-environment relations operate and influence on 
going activities in environments can be analyzed. 
 
The ecological approach employs a systems perspective that brings together 
humans, animal, and plant worlds into a single framework, within which the 
mutual interaction between the components can be, analyzed (Stoddart, 
1967; Mitchell, 1979). In this perspective, each person is part of a more 
complex network that connects people in a community with one another and 
with the external environment. Processes involved in such ecological 
adaptation include the operation of regulatory mechanisms and/or feedback 
adjustments. These regulate the resource demands with the capacity of an 
ecosystem so that extraction is balanced by generation. Critiques of the 
concept often highlight that it obscures the distinction between technical 
issues and value choices (Mitchell, 1979). 
 
On the other hand, the transactional perspective shows how environments are 
experienced in individuals, and the manner in which individuals establish 
durable relations with their environments. It contends that activity and 




experience in or with regard to the environment depend on availability of 
information and the way it is processed (Amedeo, 1993). 
 
The above ideas in their combination, loosely fused into the ecological 
framework, can help us understand the essential nature and processes by 
which human-environment relations operate and influence on going activities 
in environments. These may help us understand the environment and 
perspectives that prevailed in the evolution of the land case in Zimbabwe and 




The pre-colonial period 
 
European incursions into Zimbabwe began in the sixteenth century, when the 
Portuguese came into contact with the Shona people of the Mwene Mutapa 
kingdom of northeastern Zimbabwe. Ranger (1967: 6) notes that “hoe-
cultivation and small scale industries like weaving, gold mining, pottery and 
production of ironware built up a surplus and also that trade in luxury goods 
enhanced the country’s wealth”. 
 
Until the 1830s, there co-existed in the Central and Western part of 
Zimbabwe, another centralized system – the Rozvi confederation centered on 
the Great Zimbabwe. The Rozvi resisted Portuguese pressures, and governed 
an organized and prosperous people. Ranger (1967) quotes F.C. Selous, a 
famous hunter, writing in 1893 of the paramountancies of Zimbabwe:  
 
The peaceful people inhabiting this part of Africa must then have been at 
the zenith of their prosperity. Herds of their small but beautiful cattle 
lowed in every valley and their rich and fertile country doubtless afforded 
them an abundance of vegetable food (Ranger, 1967:  10).  
 
 
Such and similar writings by explorers and missionaries might have 
influenced European incursions into this part of the continent. 
 
Regarding land tenure, the king or chief served as the trustee who allocated 
land. The traditional land tenure system also accepted that land rights were 
inalienable; that land belonged to the living and to the unborn as well as to 
the dead. “No member of a group could sell or transfer land to an outsider as 
land was considered a natural endowment in the same category as rain, 






Similarly, Roder (1964) observes that land was open for use by followers of 
the chief who were entitled to portions of land for farming purposes for as 
long as they farmed them and kept active interest in the land allocated to 
them. They also had access to other resources such as grazing, timber, water 
and game. The various ethnic groups also practiced shifting cultivation and 
changed their lands periodically without necessarily moving their homes, 
aspects commonly practiced in the Southern African region then.  
 
The above scenario gives a synopsis of the situation that prevailed prior to 
settler occupation of Zimbabwe. The next section details how the indigenous 
people were dispossessed of their lands during the colonial era. 
 
The colonial period (1890-1980). 
 
The first white settlers, under the Pioneer Column and Rhodes’ British South 
Africa Company (BSAC) came to Zimbabwe’s Mashonaland area in 
September 1890. These were mainly gold seekers who turned themselves 
into farmers when their fortunes did not materialize. According to Austin 
(1975: 23), “deception, collusion, and confusion of Company and Crown 
interests played a significant part in the establishment of European presence 
in the territory”.  
 
In 1891, the British government issued an Order in Council declaring a 
protectorate over Mashonaland and other areas. After 1892, the BSAC 
claimed that the Lippert Concession allowed them to dispose of land in 
Mashonaland and proceeded to do so. Ranger (1967: 83) notes that in 1919, 
the Privy Council, when considering the legal basis of the European presence 
in the country, ruled, “the Lippert Concession had not given the Company 
authority to dispose of land anywhere, so that even in terms of legal theory, 
their action was unfounded”.  Austin (1975) observes that Southern Rhodesia 
was thus one of the few cases in Africa of ‘colonial acquisition by 
undisguised conquest’. 
 
Austin (1975) further highlights the circumstances in which Rhodes, the 
BSAC and the settlers, granted permission only to exploit minerals by the 
Matabele King Lobengula, fermented war and took control of Matabeleland. 
With Mashonaland occupied, the agenda shifted to militarily takeover 
Matabeleland. This was achieved in 1893 when Dr. Jameson, with a 
combined force of settlers and the Imperial Bechuanaland Border Police 
raided the Ndebele. The operation was partly financed by Rhodes’s personal 
funds and the promise of booty of Matabele land, gold claims and cattle as 




reward for the volunteers. The Matabeleland Order in Council of 1894 later 
legitimized the invasion. 
 
The Company honored its obligations to the volunteers. Ranger (1967:10) 
notes that land was “given out so lavishly not only to reward volunteers but 
also to give important sections of English society a stake in the success of the 
new Colony”. It is also noted that others received generous rewards in the 
shape of very extensive grants of land to the companies and syndicates, 
which they formed. 
 
The Matabele were dispossessed of their lands, and allocated reserves, away 
from their ancestral homes and, in the opinion of the British Deputy 
Commissioner in 1897, “badly watered, sandy and unfit for settlement” 
(Austin, 1975:25). The loss of land and other possessions provided a 
Matabele parallel to the feelings of the Shona towards the settlers (Ranger, 
1967). This resentment led to the First Chimurenga War of 1896/97. 
However, the Company and the settlers gradually suppressed the war. 
 
Chigodora (1997) notes that by 1903, the colonial administration had set up 
16 native reserves in Matabeleland and 80 in Mashonaland. Africans who 
still occupied what was now “European land” were forced to pay taxes by 
the colonial authorities as a way to force them into reserves. Roder (1964), 
basing on a Native Reserves Commission Report of 1915, captures the 
domineering attitude of the settlers on denial of the Ndebele from having 
access to fertile, darker and heavier soils. “[The Ndebele] are, however, 
showing signs of favor towards the lighter soils, and no doubt as their use of 
the heavier land outside their reserves becomes more restricted by white 
occupation, they will grow more reconciled to cultivating the granite sands” 
(Roder,  1967: 45).  
 
On the rationale used to determine the size of land to be occupied by natives, 
Whaley (1975: 15) quotes a 1914 report by the Native Reserves Commission 
on the subject: 
  
The Commission is of the opinion that it cannot be assumed that every unborn 
native is to enjoy an indefeasible right to live on the soil under tribal conditions 
and by the primitive and wasteful methods of cultivation practiced by their 
fore-fathers.  cumulative effect of the available evidence goes on to show, in 
the view of the Commission, that the aggregate area of the Reserves in 
Southern Rhodesia is more than sufficient for the present and future needs of 
the Native Population. 
 
Thus, legal administrative instruments such as these Commissions were used 





In 1923, Britain granted Rhodesia’s white settler community “responsible 
self-government”. However, the country remained a British colony and 
Britain retained the right to veto any legislation affecting the black African 
majority. Subsequently, in 1925, another Commission – the Morris Carter 
Land Commission - was set up by the British Government to look into the 
desirability of defining separate areas for use and occupation by blacks and 
whites. The Commission approved the division of land and further 
recommended that points of contact between races be minimized. Africans, 
who wanted to purchase land, would only do so in areas designated for that 
purpose. These areas were to be adjoined to reserves so that the good 
farming practices of the purchase area farmers could “trickle down” into the 
native reserves (Whaley, 1975). One wonders whether security for the whites 
was not the main reason for the establishment of native purchase areas as 
they acted as buffer zones between settler farms and native reserves!  
 
Bell and Hotchkiss (1991) note a series of repressive pieces of legislation 
that challenged customary practices of resource utilization and upset their 
traditional complementarities. Through the Land Apportionment Act (LAA) 
of 1930, land was segregated on racial lines and its ecological undertones 
restricted the use of wetland environment, an important fall back resource 
strategy for the local communities especially during dry periods. The LAA 
divided the land into White Land – 19.7 million hectares (50 %); Black Land 
– 11.7 million hectares (30 %); Native Purchase Areas – 1.8 million hectares 
(5 %); and, other – 5.8 million hectares (15 %) (Rukuni, 1994).  
 
Of further interest is the location of settler lands in relation to Zimbabwe’s 
Natural Regions (NRs). Zimbabwe is divided into five natural regions. NRs 
1 and 2 are the most productive having good soils and high natural rainfall – 
above 700mm; NR 3 has good soils and moderate rainfall – 500-700mm; and 
NRs 4 and 5 generally have poor soils and erratic rainfall averaging about 
450mm (Kay, 1970). Most of the White lands occupied the central and 
eastern highlands of the country which have fertile soils, high rainfall, 
moderate temperatures and a good road and rail transportation network,  
hence making them prime agricultural lands. On the other hand, the natives 
were mainly resettled in agriculturally marginal areas mostly with poor 
sandy soils, low rainfall, and at times very hot and tsetse fly infested as in the 
case of the northern part of the country. The majority of these lands lie in 
NRs 4 and 5 (Kay, 1970; Bell and Hotchkiss, 1991).  
 
Besides having their best lands taken by settlers, natives also lost their lands 
to wildlife. The Game and Fish Preservation Act of 1929 paved way for the 
establishment of several game reserves and National Parks including the 




Hwange Game Reserve and the Victoria Falls National Park in the north-
west part of the country (Hill, 1996; Kay, 1970). The establishment of these  
conservation schemes involved the forced removal of the natives from their 
traditional lands and often relocating them to overcrowded areas that were 
less suitable to maintain their subsistence economy (Hitchcock, 1995). While 
one can argue that such removals were dictated by the imperatives of 
development, the issue here is that Britain ignored the dispossession of 
natives of their lands by failing to veto such legislation that directly affected 
the livelihoods of the natives as had been promulgated in 1923 “responsible 
self-government” grant to the white settler community. 
 
 
Conservation interventions, intertwined with other State imperatives, often 
cut across African ecological ideas and practices because they often 
presupposed different assumptions about how land should be settled and 
used. Beinart (1989) offered interesting observations about the thinking of 
the time: “Africans were constructed as unscientific over exploiters of 
grazing, of trees, and land, who displayed an irresponsible attitude to future 
needs, either because their agrarian systems were inadequate in themselves 
or because old systems were inappropriate.” What became appropriate for 
Zimbabwe were colonial ideas, drawn from the developed countries, which 
stressed on the rigid spatial division between lands set aside for different 
purposes: forestry; game reserves; White land; and Native land. Such 
structures would be maintained through legislative Acts where Natives had 
little or no say. 
 
In the 1950s, government policy shifted from that of settling more whites to 
removing blacks remaining in white areas, and enforcing freehold tenure 
through a Native Land Husbandry Act (NLHA) of 1951. Commissioners, 
who were White, replaced Native Commissioners and took over the role of 
traditional chiefs and became primary allocation authorities of both grazing 
and farming rights. The Act enforced de-stocking and mandatory 
conservation and cropping practices. Whaley (1975) notes that the Annual 
Report for 1957, by the Secretary of Native Affairs indicated that stiff 
opposition was experienced from those areas heavily populated and over-
stocked. In fact, the natives saw the Act as a vehicle of oppression, as it gave 
the Natural Resource Board strong police powers to evict people from their 
lands on the pretext of violating their laws. Consequently, many natives were 
driven off their lands under the auspices of the Act. This led to widespread 
opposition to the land policies by the natives that culminated in the early 






On the political front, attempts by the United Federal Party in the early 1960s 
to address the land question and abolish the Land Apportionment Act of 
1930, were defeated by the Rhodesian Front (RF) of Ian Smith, a white 
minority party whose election campaign hinged on preserving land 
segregation (Christopher, 1971). Smith subsequently declared the Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence (UDI) in November 1965 and severed ties with 
Britain.  
 
When the RF regime declared Rhodesia a Republic in 1969, it promulgated a 
Republican Constitution along with a new Land Tenure Act (LTA) that 
replaced the LAA. The LTA redefined the land categories and allocated an 
almost equal amount of land between blacks and whites, or “parity” as the 
Rhodesian Front demanded. Christopher (1971) notes that the LTA classified 
all land (39 088 494 hectares) in Rhodesia into three areas: European Area 
18 205 924 hectares (46.6%) (to be occupied by the then less than 200,000 
whites); African Area 18 202 523 hectares (46.6%) of which the Tribal Trust 
Lands occupied 16 161 314 hectares (to be occupied by 7,500,000 natives); 
and, National Area 2,680,047 hectares (6.8%).  
 
 
This Act was the final straw in the litany of the natives’ dispossession of 
their lands. The new dispensation literary saw 70 percent of the most 
productive land within the hands of about one percent of the population, 
mainly whites. Hence, the 1970s saw an exodus of blacks – men and women 
– to the rank-and-file of freedom fighters who had established bases in 
neighboring Zambia, Tanzania, and later Mozambique. The war reached its 
peak in the late 1970s forcing the settler regime to agree to a negotiated 
settlement. The Lancaster House Conference, held in Britain in 1979, paved 
way for Zimbabwe’s independence in 1980. 
 
The Lancaster Agreement, included among other things: a constitution that 
was to guide the governance of the new independent nation. On the land 
issue, all parties agreed that there was to be land reform based on land 
reclamation by Government on a “willing-seller-willing-buyer” basis, with 
the British providing the necessary funds. In certain circumstances, the 
Zimbabwe Government could also acquire land compulsorily, but would 
have to pay fair, prompt and adequate compensation even in foreign 
currency. Also entrenched in the latter aspect were conditions that no 
changes were to be made to the new constitution before the lapse of ten 
years, unless there was a 100 percent agreement from the legislature to 
change it (Mubako, 2003). It was impossible to get a 100 percent agreement 
to change the constitution on the controversial issues such as land since 
whites were guaranteed a blocking 20 percent of the seats during the period. 




                                                
At independence in 1980, about 6,000 white farmers owned about 15.4 
million hectares of land of which most was in Regions 1 and 2 (Masilela and  
Weiner, 1996). With most of the prime land still owned by the few whites, 
there was considerable political pressure on the new government to 
redistribute white owned land for resettlement of both the landless and 
people from overcrowded communal areas. 
 
[ 
Post – independence period (1980 to the present). 
 
Three distinct periods can be identified when discussing the land issue 
during the post-independence eras and each of them is characterized by a 
different approach to land redistribution. During the first period - 1980 to 
1990 - Zimbabwe observed the Lancaster House Constitutional requirements 
used the evolutionary approach which hinged on market forces of ‘willing-
seller-willing buyer’ to facilitate land redistribution. The approach is similar 
to Kenya’s land reform program in the 1960s which was funded by Britain. 
In the second period 1991 to 2000, the government abandoned market based 
land purchases and adopted a quasi-revolutionary approach to designate land 
for resettlement, a similar path taken by Namibia in the mid 90s land 
reform2.  As for the last period 2000 to the present, it is characterized by the 
revolutionary approach to accelerate land redistribution.  
 
The evolutionary approach to land redistribution (1980-1990). 
 
In order to implement the land redistribution program, the Government of 
Zimbabwe created a new Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rural 
Development in 1981. Its target was to settle 162,000 families, most of who 
were displaced by the war, by 1985. The program was to be funded by the 
British government with the government of Zimbabwe providing the 
matching funds. It involved the settling of people selected by government on 
derelict farms or those willingly sold by commercial farmers. The latter 
would have to be paid fair, prompt and adequate compensation even in 
foreign currency (Zimbabwe, 1995).  
 
According to Rukuni (1994), four pilot resettlement models were designed 
with a bearing on the agro-ecological regions of the country. Model A, the 
villagized approach, allowed for family farming; Model B was the 
cooperative mode; Model C involved individual farming centered on a core 
estate; while Model D focused on individual extensive ranching. The latter 
two models were common in Regions 4 and 5. 
 





                                                
 
The pilot resettlement schemes were provided with basic infrastructure such 
as roads, boreholes, schools, clinics, depots for seeds and fertilizer and dip 
tanks for cattle. In addition, in the initial year, households were provided 
with half-hectare free tractor tillage, inputs such as fertilizer and seed for half 
a hectare to enable them to take off. Cattle, farm inputs, and implement loans 
were also made available. Agricultural extension officers were also made 
available to advise farmers on good methods of farming. 
 
Performance of the pilot resettlement exercise was affected by the vagaries 
of the weather. Kinsey (2004:1697) highlights that a three-year drought 
during the period 1982-84 negatively affected both agricultural activities and 
the settling of people. In 1985, the economy as a whole rebounded strongly 
due to a 30% jump in agricultural production3. Kinsey further notes that 
despite these droughts often reflected in the dramatic falls in savings, the 
new settlers in the pilot schemes made remarkable improvements in 
ownership of movable assets (farm equipment and implements); household 
durables and other assets such as vehicles, bicycles, grinding mills, and solar 
installations than their counterparts in the communal areas. Both, Rukuni 
(1994) and Hans Hoogeveen and Kinsey (2004) herald the success story of 
the small-scale holder farmers of the pilot resettlement program in the mid-
1980s.  The success possibly borne out of the support given to the pilot 
projects in the form of developmental packages highlighted earlier. 
 
Despite adhering to the farm purchase stipulations of the Lancaster 
Agreement, government faced problems in getting suitable resettlement land 
to replicate the pilot schemes. In an attempt to give farmland-purchasing 
priority to the Government, a Land Acquisition Act again hinged on the 
“willing-buyer-willing-seller” philosophy was passed in parliament in 1985. 
Land targeted for purchase included derelict land, underutilized land and that 
adjacent to communal area. Government still had to pay the required fair, 
prompt and adequate compensation in foreign currency (Zimbabwe, 1995).  
 
Response to changes to the Land Acquisition Act to allow government to 
purchase underutilized land from the white commercial farmers was that of 
indifference. The period saw a flurry of conversions by white farmers of 
underutilized prime land even in Regions 1 to 2 to game farming, an activity 
mostly carried out in Regions 4 and 5. Thus in a way, the farmers avoided 
having their land classified as underutilized and hence open for government 
purchase for resettlement purposes (Kinsey, 2004). Worth also noting here is 
 
3 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/economy_of_zimbabwe,  accessed on 26 March, 2008 




                                                
that during the first ten years, both Zimbabwe and Britain honored their parts 
of the Lancaster House Conference undertakings. Britain provided a total of 
£47million for land reform: £20million as a specific Land Resettlement 
Grant and £27million in the form of budgetary support while Zimbabwe 
provided matching funds to acquire land on the willing-seller-willing buyer 
basis4. 
 
The Land Resettlement Grant signed in 1981, came to an end in 1988 as the 
grant was virtually spent. An evaluation of the pilot land resettlement in 
1988 by the then UK Overseas Development Administration (ODA) showed 
that on the whole, real progress had been made on the program. Although the 
rate of implementation of the program, which had a good take-off in the 
early 1980s dragged at a snail’s pace in the late 80s, it proceeded peacefully 
and was ‘completely in accordance with the law’ (Mubako, 2003; Kinsey, 
2004). In the Matabeleland provinces, the program was temporarily 
disrupted by political insurrections (Akpan et. al, 2006).  
 
Faced with costly land, and poor infrastructure and access to water, and the 
unwillingness of commercial farmers to give a portion of their farmlands for 
resettlement purposes, only 52,000 families were resettled by 1990, far from 
the target of 162,000 families supposed to be settled by 1985 (Zimbabwe, 
1995). The Ministry responsible for resettlement was abolished.  
 
Reactions to the dismal performance of the resettlement program during the 
period were polarized along racial lines. Siso (1989) notes that when the 
country’s largest circulation paper, The Sunday Mail, urged the government 
to embark on a wholesale takeover of the land from the white farmers, the 
Chairman of the white Commercial Farmers’ Union (CFU) is said to have 
retorted: “To threaten farmers with wholesale takeover is highly 
irresponsible and is causing a loss of confidence at a time when the 
government had worked so hard to restore it. The fact that farmers seem 
reluctant to sell their land should be applauded in certain quarters as victory 
for the government since it shows how much confidence the white people, 
and farmers in particular, have in the government” (CFU, 1989: 32).  
 
While in certain quarters this may have an element of truth in it, personal 
observations indicate that lack of cooperation, and arrogance and 
indispensability seem to define the attitude of some white commercial 
farmers to government’s resettlement program during the first ten years. This 
seemed to strain the relationship between the two parties. On the other hand, 
 





the “willing-buyer, willing seller” concept itself was seen in close 
government circles as a ploy to buy more time on land reform and eventually 
derail it as evidenced by the commercial farmers’ unwillingness to part off 
with their land. After all it had not succeeded in redistributing land in Kenya 
where it had been applied in the 1960s! 
 
[ 
The quasi- revolutionary approach to land redistribution: 1990 – 2000. 
 
When the Lancaster House Constitution expired at the tenth independence 
anniversary in 1990, and the willing-seller willing-buyer constitutional 
requirement expired, the Zimbabwe government embarked on a review of 
the land reform program. In 1991, it announced new proposals to resettle 
100,000 families on 5 million hectares of land to be acquired from the Large 
Scale Farming Areas. To facilitate this program, government made a number 
of changes to both the Constitution and the Land Acquisition Act of 1985. 
According to the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment Bill No. 11 of 
1991, government now had the right to acquire all land needed for the 
program, including fully utilized land and pay the owner in local currency. 
Such compensation only needed to be fair and paid within reasonable time. 
Previously, government had to make such payments in foreign currency 
(Rukuni, 1994).  
 
In addition, under the Land Acquisition Act of 1992, government now had 
the power to ‘designate’ land needed for the program. Land targeted for 
designation included: derelict land; under-utilized land; land owned by 
absentee-landlords; land from farmers with more than one farm or with 
oversized farms; and land adjacent to communal areas. Farmers opposed to 
having their land designated were required to file written objections to 
government within 30 days of receiving the notice to compulsorily acquire 
the land. 
 
The provision of ousting the jurisdiction of the courts was the subject of 
many criticisms on the Act. Human rights lawyers argued that any law that 
sought to exclude the courts from determining issues affecting the rights of 
individuals contradicts the concept of the ‘rule of the law’ (Rukuni, 1994). 
 
The reaction of the white community to the Bill was that of anger and they 
accused the government of trading “collective ideology for private 
efficiency” (The Economist, 26/01/1991). On the statement that the 
government would buy half of the remaining commercial farmland, the 
Economist commented that the government’s “motive is political: to reward 
the peasants who fought [the] independence war against Ian Smith’s white 





                                                
government ….’ (Ibid: 40). It also reported that the CFU feelings were that 
too much resettlement could endanger Zimbabwe’s special status as an 
African country that can feed itself, an aspect that later became true, though 
for the wrong reasons. 
 
While the war of words was going on over the Land Acquisition Act of 
1992, Banks et al. (1997) note that on May 1, 1993, the government released 
a list of 70 commercial farms, encompassing approximately 190,000 hectares 
which it planned to purchase for the distribution under the authority of the 
new Act. The CFU denounced the government for violating its pledge to buy 
only “derelict and underutilized” properties. The Economist (22/05/1993) 
highlights white farmers’ argument that “parceling out commercial farmland 
in small plots will reduce the productivity and so jeopardize the country’s 
ability both to feed its people and export valuable crops” (Ibid,  54). The 
farmers went on to say that, unless well-trained black farmers who have 
ownership rights that give them the incentives to invest farm the new land, 
the resettlement program was bound to fail. Again, from government’s point 
of view, such comments seemed aimed at derailing the land redistribution 
program. 
 
On the international arena, Western donors, including the British reportedly 
warned the Zimbabwe government that it risked suspension of aid payments 
if it followed through its proposed acquisition (The Economist, 22/05/1993). 
The British did not disburse any further funds to Zimbabwe during this 
period and the UK Land Resettlement Grant finally closed in 1996 with 
£3million still unspent 5(Zimbabwe, 1995). Thus, the British’s end of 
support to the program seems mainly to be due to the ideological differences 
on how to proceed with the resettlement ex
 
In early 1994, the government on its own set up the Independent Commission 
of Inquiry into Appropriate Agricultural Land Tenure Systems to investigate 
among other things, how Zimbabwe’s land reform program could be carried 
out. Its report, submitted in October 1994, made seemingly feasible 
recommendations on how Zimbabwe’s land reform program could be carried 
out. The Report identified seemingly feasible tools for land redistribution. 
These include land acquisition; incentives for voluntary sub-division; sub-
leasing; progressive land taxes; land ceilings; and, restriction on the number 
of farms per individual entity (Table 1). 
 
 





Table 1: Farm Sizes by Natural Region. 
 
Natural Region S-SCF (ha) M-SCF (ha) L-SCF (ha) 
1 15-25 100 250 
2a 25-40 200 350 
2b 40-50 250 400 
3 60-80 300 500 
4 150-200 700 1,500 
5 250-350 1500 2000 
    [    
Key:    
S-SCF = Small Scale Commercial 
Farms   
M-SCF = Medium Scale 
Commercial Farms   
L-SCF = Large Scale Commercial 
Farms   
ha = hectare    
    
Source: Adapted from Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural 
Resettlement (2001). 
 
The British government and some major multi-lateral organizations such as 
UNDP were not interested in the study as indicated by their failure to 
mention it in their documentation on Zimbabwe land reform6 (UNDP, 2002). 
Thus, the views contained in the study were contrary to their thinking. 
 
After a three-year relative impasse on the land issue, in June 1997, the 
Government announced the Land Reform and Resettlement Program – Phase 
II in which it outlined a program aimed at acquiring 5 million hectares on 
which to settle 91,000 families based on the recommendations of 1994 
Commission’s Report. Zimbabwe’s subsequent request for financial 
assistance from Britain to implement the resettlement program was turned 
down on the ground that the program lacked transparency. The Government 
proceeded with the accelerated land reform program and designated about 5 
million hectares of commercial farmland. It argued that Britain was obliged 
to finance land reform, by compensating the white farmers as agreed at 
Lancaster (The Economist, 06/12/1997).  
 
The Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (2007) noted that during this period, major 
multi-lateral institutions gradually stopped doing business with Zimbabwe. 
African Development Bank (ADB) stopped supporting Zimbabwe by way of 
                                                 
6 http://www.fco.gov.uk, accessed 6 May 2008.  




                                                
balance of payment support 1998. This was followed by the International 
Monitory Fund (IMF) in 1999, and the World Bank did the same in 2001.  
 
With Zimbabwe perceived as a risky country to do business with, 
Zimbabwean companies subsequently were unable to access lines of credit 
and had to pay cash for strategic imports such as oil, agricultural plant and 
equipment. These measures not only affected the agricultural productivity of 
the country as a whole, but also affected the resettlement program. The 
success story of the resettlement program of the late 80s turned into a 
pathetic nightmare in the 90s when external assistance dried up and farmers 
could not access inputs. Farm production plummeted7 .  
 
Willems (2004) has this to say on what led to the strong decline of the 
Zimbabwe economy in the late 1990s: 
 
In 1997, the government finally succumbed to the war veterans’ demands when 
it announced an offer to them of pensions, although these had not been included 
in the government budget. The unbudgeted spending on the war veteran 
pensions, coupled with a decision in 1998 to intervene in the war in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo and resultant decrease of donor funds, and 
the rapid devaluation of the Zimbabwean dollar as a result of declining investor 
confidence led to a strong decline of the economy (ibid, 1770-71). 
 
What is evident from the above statements is the fact that there were other 
intertwining factors that led to the strong decline of Zimbabwe’s economy 
other than those related to the land issue. Whether Britain had an influence in 
their interpretation is open for discussion.  
 
However, Willem (2004) further notes that discontent by the civil society 
and the labor movement over the economy and the political climate, led in 
September 1999, to the formation of a new political party – the Movement 
for Democratic Change (MDC). Its neo-liberal market based land policies 
that had the support of the white commercial farmers and the donor 
community challenged the government’s ‘radical’ land reform program. 
Thus, the land issue, which seemed to unite the natives of all persuasions 
since the first ‘Chimurenga’ yielded to the new dispensation, a new reality 
that ushered the country into the 21st century.  
 
In December, 1999, government implemented some recommendations of the 
Independent Commission of Inquiry into Appropriate Agricultural Land 
 





                                                
Tenure Systems, especially the legislated the ceilings on farm sizes though 
with some slight modifications on the sizes8. 
 
 
The revolutionary approach to land redistribution: 2000 to present.  
 
In 2000, government resolved to implement Phase II at an accelerated pace – 
“Fast Track” - as abandoning the land reform would certainly ferment unrest 
by the landless. The target of the program was to redistribute 9 million 
hectares to 160,000 beneficiaries from among the poor and 51,000 small-to-
medium scale indigenous commercial farmers based on the new land ceilings 
(Ibid). This move was seen in opposition circles as an electioneering 
gimmick as parliamentary elections were due to be held that year 2000. 
 
To facilitate this, government proposed changing the constitution to allow 
flexibility in effecting compulsory land acquisition. Although the new 
constitution was rejected in a referendum in February 2000, the government 
pushed changes related to land through parliament separately. The 
government introduced the same land clause as an amendment to the old 
constitution that was duly passed by parliament. The clause obligated Britain 
as the former colonial power “to pay compensation for agricultural land 
compulsorily acquired for resettlement, through an adequate fund established 
for the purpose, and if the former colonial power fails to pay compensation 
through such a fund, the Government of Zimbabwe has no obligation to pay 
compensation for agricultural land compulsorily acquired for resettlement” 
(Mubako, 2003: 6). On its part, the Government of Zimbabwe would pay for 
improvements made on the farms. 
 
Mubako (2003) notes that simultaneously as changes were being made to the 
constitution, war veterans moved on to some commercial farms in different 
parts of the country until 1,800 farms were occupied by ex-combatants and 
landless villagers. At the same time, legal battles took place between the 
white farmers and the ex-combatants. The position remained the same until 
June 2001 when government finished regularizing the occupation and 
moving illegal occupiers to land acquired by the government. Despite strong 
objections from the CFU, Britain, and other donor institutions, UNDP (2002) 
notes that by mid-November, 2001, about 160,000 families had been 
resettled on 3,074 previously large-scale commercial farms covering an area 
of about 7.3 million hectares.  
 
 
8 www.talkzimbabwe.com. Accessed on 17March, 2008.  




                                                
In late 2001, the Zimbabwe Supreme Court gave its seal of approval of the 
resettlement program. In arriving at its decision, it was guided by principles 
of social justice for all concerned and not by “narrow legalism” (Mubako, 
2003). The decision did not go down well with the white farmers and some 
sections of the donor community as they labeled it partisan, in support of the 
government. Anyway, by August 2002, government announced that the 
resettlement program had arrived at its official conclusion, although some 
follow up operations remained. 
 
During this period, complementary initiatives were also mooted by the 
private sector to boost the resettlement program. One such initiative is the 
Zimbabwe Joint Resettlement Initiative (ZJRI) mooted by the CFU in March 
2001. Key features of ZJRI included an offer of 1 million hectares of 
uncontested land; settlement for small-scale commercial farmers; 1 hectare 
of free tillage for each of the new families; a grant of Z$60 million for 
agricultural inputs; among other things.  Government accepted the initiative 
in September 2001. However, the lack of immediate cash to provide full 
lump-sum compensation for land derailed the program9 . 
 
The ‘Fast Track’ resettlement program was heavily criticized from all 
quarters. The white commercial farmers were split on how to deal with the 
government. The CFU adopted a non-confrontational approach while its 
splinter – Justice for Agriculture – adopted a confrontational one and 
encouraged its members to remain on farms acquired by government for 
resettlement. In fact, violent confrontations became a common feature 
throughout the country between the white farmers and farm workers on one 
hand, and the war veterans and the ‘landless’ people on the other. These 
confrontations often resulted in the loss of human life, property, and 
disrupted farming activities (EIU, 2002; Willem, 2004).  
 
The Zimbabwe government was accused of lacking democracy and good 
governance, trampling on the rule of law and engaging in human rights 
abuses. The media blitz on the government was unprecedented but aptly 
expressed the inner feelings of those negatively affected by the program: 
“Land reform chaotic”, “Zanu thugs invade the farms”, “Rogue war vets 
evict white farmers”, “Land reform to benefit Mugabe’s cronies” (The 
Sunday Mail, 18 April 2004; Willems, 2004).   
 
Britain dragged Zimbabwe’s land issue to the Commonwealth Prime 
Ministers’ Conference in 2001 in Australia without success. Some members 
 





felt that the colonial power was unnecessarily involving the Commonwealth 
into a bilateral dispute between itself and Zimbabwe over the latter’s 
decision to acquire land from white farmers mostly of British origin to 
resettle the landless majority. Zimbabwe subsequently left the 
Commonwealth (Mubako, 2003). 
 
The American government, seemingly concerned with the human rights 
issues, and government’s inability to protect private property and uphold the 
rule of law, also equally built pressure on Zimbabwe. The Zimbabwe 
Democracy and Recovery Act was passed through the Senate in July 2001. 
The Bill called for targeted sanctions on President Mugabe and his cabinet 
members (EIU, 06/2001). The Bill, thinly veiled as delivering ‘targeted 
sanctions’, virtually throttled Zimbabwe from doing business with the 
‘international community’, thus forcing it to adapt to its current ‘look east’ 
policy. The policy seems to be yielding some desirable results as evidenced 
by the recent investment moves by countries such as China and Malaysia. 
 
The resettlement program was froth with anomalies: issues of multiple farm 
ownership; issuance of more than one letter offer for a single farm; the 
returning of land to white former commercial farmers; and slow farm take-up 
by settler beneficiaries. To address some of these issues, in 2003, a 
Presidential Land Review Committee was established. Its Report cited 5 key 
areas that needed the government’s attention: framework for agricultural 
service provision, human capacity and skills development, agricultural 
research and technology transfer, agricultural inputs and financial services 
and domestic and international markets for agricultural products to which 
government promised to look into (The Herald, 15/4/2004).  
 
However, it is the author’s observation that the Report failed to give due 
weight to the humanitarian crisis resulting from the evictions of former farm 
workers by the new settlers. It also paid lip service to the vandalism 
purportedly perpetrated by both the ruling party and opposition party ‘thugs’ 
that disturbed farming operations.  
 
On the issue of tenure of resettlement schemes, in June 2004, government 
announced that all land from crop fields to wildlife conservancies, would 
become state property. Farmland deeds would be replaced with 99-year 
leases, while leases for wildlife conservancies would be limited to 25 years. 
This position infuriated the main opposition party and its leader, Morgan 
Tsvangirai was quoted as saying: “- - - Today Mugabe is talking of 
wholesale nationalization, converting our land into dead capital - - - This is 
an act of recklessness. The constitution respects private property rights. 




Where does he plan to take this country? Nationalization is a nationalistic 
concept that the world abandoned a long time ago for obvious reasons” (The 
Herald, 14/06/2004).  
 
The above sentiments illustrate the polarization of views on the land 
redistribution issue. While one can argue that similar post-colonial 
nationalization of land took place in other African countries such as Nigeria, 
Zambia, Mozambique, Tanzania – to name some, such moves were orderly 
and not characterized by violence as has been in the Zimbabwe case.  
 
Parliament subsequently passed a constitutional amendment, signed into law 
on September 12, 2005, that nationalized Zimbabwe’s farmland accordingly. 
Thus, landowners no longer have any legal right to challenge in court the 
government’s decision to expropriate their land. 
 
On the economic front, the country as a whole was in doldrums during the 
period. Between 2000 and 2007, the country’s economy contracted by as 
much as 40%; inflation was 66,000%; unemployment hovered around 80%; 
and there was persistent shortage of foreign exchange, local currency, fuel, 
inputs (seeds, fertilizer, and pesticides), medicine, and food. GDP per capita 
is said to have dropped by 40%, agricultural output by 51% and industrial 
production by 47%. The absence of balance of payments support, declining 
capital inflows, recurrent droughts and global rising oil prices certainly 
undermined the country’s productive capacity as well as the land reform 
program. The impact of these issues on the populace was devastating and 
saw the government for the first time lose both the presidential and 
parliamentary elections held on 29 March 2008.  
 
After a political debacle, and a re-run of the presidential elections which 
were boycotted by the main opposition party, political maneuvers mainly 
from the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) and the African 
Union (AU) resulted in the formation of the government of National Unity – 
a coalition government formed on 13 February, 2009 following the 
inaugurations of Morgan Tsvangirai as Prime Minister, and Arthur 
Mutambara and Thokozani Khupe as Deputy Prime Ministers. This Global 
Political Coalition (GPA) is guaranteed by South Africa, SADC, and the AU 
(Bell, 2009).  
 
Even under such an arrangement, the efforts seem not enough to reassure 
commercial farmers of their security as expressed by Deon Theron “ … it 
does not change the reality that farm invasions have not stopped … things 





(Bell, 2009). However, of late, the South African President Jacob Zuma 
expressed optimism that Zimbabwe’s leadership has made significant strides 
in resolving contentious issues and the country is on an irreversible path to 
finally resolving its problems (Mutema, 2010). It is anticipated that Theron’s 
pessimism in the GPA will soon be a thing of the past. 
 
The way forward. 
 
[ 
What this study has demonstrated is that while the issue of land is essentially 
a political one, land reform needs to be tackled from a holistic approach 
which looks at the intertwined historical, socio-economic, political, cultural 
factors of a people. In Zimbabwe, land reforms carried out during the 
colonial era, no doubt, were crafted on gross injustice though they followed 
acceptable constitutional forms. The evolution of the land issue discussed 
earlier amply demonstrates this. On the other hand, the post-independence 
land reform, also followed recognizable constitutional forms. The British 
Government agreed to fund the land reform program and did so jointly with 
the Zimbabwean government and according to the law.  
 
Hi-cups developed in the mid-90s when Britain stopped participating in the 
program purportedly due to lack of transparency, though it is quite clear that 
ideological differences especially relating to the ‘willing-seller, willing-
buyer’ concept negatively affected the resettlement exercise. Worth noting 
here is that Zimbabwe’s frustrating experience with the ‘willing-seller-
willing-buyer’ concept to purchase land for resettlement is not unique in the 
region. South Africa and Namibia have also been implementing similar post-
independence land reform programs hinged on the ‘willing-seller-willing-
buyer’ and face similar problems (Malefane, 2008). Thus, the historical 
narratives on how the natives were dispossessed of their lands and the 
subsequent Lancaster Constitutional Conference agreement all indicate that 
Britain has an obligation to facilitate the purchase of land for resettlement. 
Modalities on how the cooperation can be resuscitated can be re-negotiated 
amicably by the two parties.  
 
What this study further illustrates is the need for pragmatism in addressing 
the land issue. Governments of sovereign states should be given the latitude 
to do what is best for the majority of their people as per the Zimbabwe 
Supreme Court ruling of 2001 which legitimized the land reform program. 
However, scenarios of land grabbing, and multiple land ownership 
highlighted in the Presidential Land Review Committee of 2003 spoil what 
probably are well meant programs. This calls for a land audit by all the major 
players - The British Government, Zimbabwe Government, representatives 




from the opposition parties and commercial farms unions to establish the 
status quo on the land reform. The Audit Commission can then recommend 
the way forward on the program.  
 
There is also a need for a re-look at the current land ceilings legislated in 
1999. Ceilings of up to 2,000 hectares per farm for Regions 4 and 5 are too 
generous considering the current population dynamics of Zimbabwe; hence 
the need to reduce them further to about 1,000 hectares. High annual 
population growth rates of about 3.1 percent will mean that in 10 to 20 years 
to come, there is bound to be a shortage of land for new household 
formations. If government is satisfied that communal people in Region 5 can 
attain their well-being on 15-20 hectares of land, why should experienced 
commercial farmers be expected not to survive on 1,000 hectares? What is 
required in these areas are not the 2,000 hectares per farmer as legislated, but 
the necessary infrastructure such as dams for irrigation, electricity, which 
facilitate farmers to realize their full potential on smaller areas. 
 
Another aspect not addressed with the resettlement exercise is the creation of 
land trusts. The land resettlement program should go hand in hand with the 
creation of land trusts for future generations. Even in developed countries 
such as the United States – the citadels of market rationalizations – the 
Federal Government is still actively establishing land trusts to cater for 
future generations as per my personal experiences there. Thus, such pro-
active approaches need to be integrated into Zimbabwe’s land redistribution 
program. 
 
Lastly, there is need to engage the international community to support the 
resettlement program. It should be acknowledge that mistakes have been 
made in the implementation of the exercise of which corrective measures 
have been recommended. However, the international community should go 
ahead and provide Zimbabwe with the necessary moral, financial, material 
and technical support to facilitate the resettlement program and avert the 
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